737 Max, software testing update

[Ray Tackett]

The linked article cites the lack of redundancy in the AOA system, even with two sensors in play. Back when computers were crude, heavy, and expensive, Apollo spacecraft had three which voted on everything. If one got voted out, a warning light came on, and the other two took over.

The article also touches on lax FAA oversight and possible worldwide loss of credibility for both Boeing and the FAA.

[Reams Goodloe]

Yea, March 10, 2020 at 5:45 UTC might be a good day and time for resumption of flights, to create a permanent reminder of deaths caused by a poor design with lack of redundancy or cross-check.

Reams

[Ray Tackett]

Let's not forget that all this started with significant aerodynamic changes to the aircraft, which Boeing attempted to paper over with software while keeping pilots, including its own test pilots, in the dark.

It appears to me that the desire to avoid a possible new type certificate for the aircraft, plus a new type rating and attendant training for pilots was the initial motivation. The "papering over" was, as Reams points out, done with a lethally cheap design which had neither redundancy nor cross-checks.

[Terry Carraway]

However, the response to the issue is that same as similar failures with runaway trim on EVERY 737 since the -100.

[Tom Charlton]

Let's not forget that all this started with significant aerodynamic changes to the aircraft . . . the desire to avoid a possible new type certificate for the aircraft, plus a new type rating and attendant training for pilots was the initial motivation.

Hi Ray,

Gosh I sure remember traveling in the first -200s. From then to now, continuous evolution: power-plants, wings and stretches.

Wondering: Does a 737 Type Rating really cover all 737s from the very earliest -200 to the latest -800 stretch models? Seems the “handling characteristics” would also be markedly different even prior to this “max” iteration.

Actually, I’ve always questioned Boeings thinking regarding the stretching of this airframe at the price of greatly increased V_R and touchdown speeds because of the short main gear legs.

Ya know: at the beginning of this clusterf _ _ k, I figured the stand-down might last a month or three at most until things get sorted out. Boy was I wrong<ng>.

Having a clue now, about the implementation of the “max” band-aid, I’m pretty disappointed in Boeing managerial and engineering hierarchy. FAA too.

Thank goodness for legacy flight crews who know how the f to handle a run-away trim.

Regards,
Tom Charlton (who’s never been “typed” to operate any large jet aircraft)

[Dave Siciliano]

Another proof of the adage that there’s never just one cockroach:-)

[Ray Tackett]

Tom,

One of the most galling things to me, out of many in this mess, was outsourcing the software to an Indian outfit which has an office in the Seattle area. There have been reports of communication problems between the Boeing engineers who wrote the software specs and the outsource outfit.

I spent far too much of my career, blood pressure, and dispostion mucking out the work of "offshore" software houses and system administrators whose only qualification was working cheap. I have hours of horror stories, many of which cost American businesses serious money -- more than they saved by outsourcing. Still, ignorant managers listen to the bean counters instead of the subject matter experts.